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Abstract: This paper examines the determinants of CEO compensation. There are many factors that influ-
ence CEO compensation. For this research three factors has been selected: companies size, accounting factor 
and market factor. The study looks at the relationship between each of this factors and directors remunera-
tion. Sample of companies listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) and Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) 
has been investigated over the period of 2007 – 2010. Data has been collected through annual reports content 
analysis and announcement on websites of LSE and WSE. Linear regression has been run on collected data. 
Positive correlation has been found between directors’ remuneration and companies’ size in both British  
and Polish listed companies. The relationship is also positive between directors pay and companies perfor-
mance. Companies’ performance has been assets by return on equity ratio (ROE) and Tobin’s Q.  
All the findings are consistent with the outcome presented within previous research by variety of scholars. 
Key words: corporate governance, companies’ performance, director’s remuneration, agency cost, CEO 
compensation. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Corporate governance was first introduced by  
A. Smith. He highlighted the changes in companies’ 
behaviour as a consequence of separation of ownership 
and control. There is an ongoing debate at present how 
corporate governance should be define (Jarzemowska 
[13], pp. 22-34). The concept of corporate governance 
can be looked at form legal and economic perspective. 
Economic approach describe corporate governance  
as “an institutional mechanism for regulating the rela-
tionship between the participants of corporate con-
tracts, especially between managers and shareholders 
(...). It is a set of principles affecting the supervision 
and accountability of the company.” (Ignyś-Lipowiecka 
[12], pp. 215-216).  
Corporate governance is strictly related with: 
• accountability - the way in which managers are 
accounttable to shareholders, 
• communication - how the company obtain and 
communicate information, 
• relationships - diversified in terms of economic 
conditions and national traditions, between  
the owners and managers of corporations. 
The main aim of corporate governance is to protect 
shareholders interest against misused of their capital  
by managers of a company. The rationale for the use  
of these practices may be the fact that the principles  
of corporate governance are an important factor when 
assessing a company. It could affect the valuation  
of the company or influence the investment decision  
of potential investor. 
The models of corporate governance are the formal 
systems of accountability of top management to share-
holders and they that should create an integrated value 
for the shareholder. These models are based on two 
assumptions:  
• maximization of  shareholder value  is the best  way  
to ensure their prosperity, 
• financial goals  can be achieved  by  building  long 
term relationships with all stakeholders. 
This allows to regard relationships with employees, 
customers, investors, suppliers and the community  
as an essential source for improving companies com-
petitiveness. Good relationship is understood as value  
of information, reputation, contracts. The model  
of stakeholders groups (a network of formal and infor-
mal relationships of corporations - a pluralistic ap-
proach) is based on the assumption that the company is 
a social institution and therefore can extend its influ-
ence on the prosperity of society and brings benefits 
not only to shareholders but also to wide groups  
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of other parties, as many companies may spend part  
of their profits on social objectives. This shows  
the direct connections “between social obligations, 
social responsibility and corporate social response.” 
(Kopycińska [17], p. 197). 
The UK represent single tire corporate governance 
model. The major role is played by The Board of Di-
rector (executive and non-executive), who are elected 
at General Annual Meeting (AGM). The role of Board 
of Director is to manage the company on behalf of and 
in the best interest of shareholders (Gajewska-
Jedwabny [7], p. 492). On the other hand Polish capital 
marked is at quite early stage of developing corporate 
governance practice. The corporate governance princi-
pled main aim is to prevent some negative phenomena, 
such as fraud or violations of rights of minority share-
holders (Gajewska-Jedwabny [7], p. 502).  
Solarz ([26], p. 274) stress that as Anglo - Saxon model 
has a strong relationship between the remuneration  
of director and company performance, for Polish com-
panies the remuneration of directors grow faster than 
profit, return on assets (ROA) and return on capital 
employed (ROE). 
The recent academic debate within corporate govern-
ance concentrates on the relationship between CEO 
remuneration1 and companies’ performance. Investors 
are becoming more and more concern by companies’ 
mismanagement after a series of corporate scandal such 
as Enron, World Com, Parmalat, Maxwell, Polly Peck 
etc. “Investors are shocked and apprehensive after re-
cent news about huge payment of £1,7 billion in bonus-
es to the managers of RBS (Royal Bank  
of Scotland) despite bank making a £3,6 billion loss 
during 2009” (Seel [24]). This example shows the in-
consistency of classical compensation theory, as only 
improved performance should be awarded by higher 
remuneration. Investors start questioning high paid 
management contracts as being unreasonable more 
often than ever. 
The problem with discrepancies between managers’ 
compensation and investors’ expectation is strongly 
address by agency theory and has been investigated  
by many researchers in the last three decades (Jensen  
et al. [14], pp. 255-268; Kato et al. [16], pp.1-19; Oe-
tomo et al. [20]). According to agency theory principal 
- agent relationships is a contract under which one  
                                                            
1 For the purpose of this paper compensation, remuneration, 
salary, pay, payment will be used as synonyms and will describe 
the total value of reward allocated to the directors. 
or more persons (the principal engage another person - 
the agent) are engaged to perform some service on their 
behalf which involves delegating some decision mak-
ing authority to the agent. For this services and contri-
bution to shareholders wealth the agents are expecting 
to be properly rewarded, but the agents for obvious 
reasons do not always act in a way which contributes  
to maximising shareholders’ (owners’, principals’) 
wealth.  
Hence, the owners are forced to create  
and implement different incentive schemes and moni-
toring schemes for agents to minimize deviations.  
As it has been proved by many research managers 
(agents) work more efficiently only if they receive 
strong motivation such as perks, bonuses, fringe bene-
fits, stock options, etc. If the agent should act in the 
best interest of the shareholder the efficiency (E -  
a desirable effect) is based on the appropriate relation-
ship between following factors: the agent action  
in the interests of principal (b), the intensity of work 
the agent (i) and agent remuneration or criteria  
on which remuneration is based (w). (Gruszecki [9], 
pp. 220).  This is expressed by the formula: 
 E  =  f(b, i, w) (1) 
Regardless the large number of conducted researches 
concerning agency costs there are still some reserva-
tions about the role the different incentives play  
in managers performance and what is the best structure 
of mangers (directors) remunerations. Although many 
empirical studies claim that incentive schemes can 
notably increase productivity of mangers and an opti-
mal compensation contract is a cure for the principal - 
agent conflict, some research or even recent examples, 
give grounds for considering high pay-performance 
contracts as not reasonable2.  
Therefore, it becomes increasingly interesting to test 
the relationship between directors’ remuneration  
and company performance. The first part of the paper 
describes the different incentive incorporated in direc-
tors’ remuneration package. The second part analyse 
current state of research with directors pay-
performance. Third part discusses the methodology 
used in the study and results obtained. The last part 
presents conclusions and recommendations. 
                                                            
2 See RBS example. 
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The research has been conducted on companies listed  
on London Stock Exchange and Warsaw Stock Ex-
change. The period taken into analysis covers the years 
2007-2010. 
 
2 Directors remuneration 
 
Companies’ directors can be rewarded in many ways. 
They receive basic salary, which includes pension con-
tributions and prerequisites such as companies’ car, 
club membership, etc. In addition, top executives usual-
ly obtain bonuses that are usually linked to the direc-
tors’ performance. They can also be entitled to long - 
term incentives plans usually in the form of stock op-
tions. The most commune incentive programs are: 
• stock option plan, 
• restricted stock plan, 
• performance plan, 
• deferred compensation plan, 
• performance based cash compensation plan, 
• profit related plan, 
• company Share Option Plan. 
The basic executive salary is usually determined 
through benchmarking method. This is conducted  
by remuneration committee and is based on directors’ 
qualification, experience, past success and firm size.  
In the recent years, it can observe continuous increase 
of directors’ salaries as they usually argue for competi-
tive rewards and expect the increase on yearly basis. 
The new trend has been detected of new CEO (Chief 
Executive Directors or Managing Directors) requesting 
higher remuneration package than currently serving 
CEO.  
At the end of financial year director are usually re-
warded with cash bonuses. The size of the bonus is 
based on the company performance over the previous 
12 months and is typically is related to profit measure-
ment such as earnings before interest and tax (EBIT)  
or earning per share (EPS). The other commonly use 
measure is economic value added (EVA). In addition  
to the mention measures CEO contract usually have  
a minimum threshold that needs to be reached in order 
to qualify for the bonus. The bonus can be paid as  
a lump sum or as a percentage in relation to chosen 
measure. Many professional bodies are in favour  
of bonuses versus pay rise as bonuses are awards  
for realised current achievements and pay raises are 
increase for the future unrealised performance3. 
The most popular market - orientated incentive pay is 
executive stock option. It allows directors to purchase 
the shares at a fixed price, called price or strike price. 
This means that if the share price reaches the higher 
level than strike price, the directors will gain additional 
profit. This approach encourages CEO and other direc-
tors to efficiently manage the company as the better 
company performs the higher share price can be 
achieved. Most of the researchers consider this method 
as aligning the mangers and shareholders goals4. 
Some researchers stress that executive option contrib-
uted to governance failure in 1990s and early 2000s 
(e.g. Enron). That’s why two new incentives have been 
recently introduced; restricted stock grants and perfor-
mance share. Restricted stock include common stocks 
on which limitation has been imposes. The limitations 
are related to the time for which the share cannot be 
sold or to the certain goals that is need to be achieved 
before the shares can be sold. The advantage of this 
tactics versus option is that its value is not impacted by 
asymmetric5. Performance share approach describes the 
situation in which the executives are award the shares 
only if certain criteria are achieved such as for example 
EPS. In this sense, the shears are regarded as rewards 
for past - realised achievement6. 
 
3 Directors payment and companies  
performance 
 
The academic interest in executive pay began in the 
early 80’s. Most of the researchers tried to find out 
relation between executive pay and firm performance. 
Some tried to figure out what factors influence execu-
tive compensation, how much the firm should pay  
or when firm should pay more to motivate executives 
etc. The majority research on executive compensation 
has been guided by agency theory. As managers are  
the main decision makers, it is therefore essential  
to motivate managers or directors through contract  
                                                            
3 The median bonus payment for directors in large American 
firms was $2,17 million in 2007. 
4 The most common stock options are for 10 years. 
5 It has been 12% increase in long - term restricted stock in the 
last 6 years. 
6 It can be observe that in the last 5 years the use of performance 
share as an element of directors remuneration increased by 36%. 
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or offer so that they bind their interests with the inter-
ests of shareholders. 
Several researches undertook investigation into direc-
tors’ remuneration focusing on relation between CEO 
pay and firm performance (Cosh et al. [3], pp. 469-492; 
Conyon [2], pp. 493-510; Gregg et al. [8], pp. 1-9; Kato 
[16], pp. 93-510; Randøy et al. [21], pp. 57-81). Jensen 
et al. ([14], pp. 255-268) tested pay - performance sen-
sitivity in different variations of incentives (salaries, 
bonuses, stock options, etc) and found that there is  
a positive and statistically significant relationship be-
tween performance of a firm and managers’ pay but  
it is rather small. The sensitivity of directors’ remu-
neration is “about $3,25 per $1 000 change in share-
holder wealth”. They also established that CEOs  
of larger firms have fewer stock options and enjoy less 
monetary incentives than CEOs from smaller firms, 
which is consistent with Demsetz et al. ([4], pp. 1155-
1177) study.  
Jensen et al. ([14], pp. 255-268) stress, that their find-
ings are incoherent with optimal contracting models. 
They also argue that the change in shareholder wealth 
may not be the best indicator of CEO performance. 
They agree with Holmström ([11], pp. 74-91) hypothe-
ses that optimal contracts and performance objectives 
for managing directors should not be only liked to main 
shareholder objective – increase in shareholder wealth, 
but also should reflect the range of consecutive 
measures, which will help to assess how close, is exec-
utives’ choice of actions to principal’s goals. It can be 
different accounting indicators, comparison with other 
CEOs from the same industry and etc. 
Edmans et al. [5] proposed a multiplicative model, 
which incorporates the integrated theory of sensitivity 
and level of executives’ pay in market equilibrium.  
The innovation in comparison to the current approach 
is “Firstly, motivated by first principles, consumer 
theory, and macroeconomic models and multiplicative 
preferences in the principal – agent problem” and sec-
ondly “endogenize total pay in a market equilibrium by 
embedding the principal–agent problem into a competi-
tive assignment model of CEO talent” (Edmans et al. 
[5], p. 2). 
Demsetz et al. ([4], pp. 1155-1177) as well as Jensen  
et al. ([14], pp. 255-268) stress that incentives schemes 
are very weak in big corporations probably because  
of weakness of corporate governance in such firms. 
This means linear models predict that dollar – dollar 
incentives should be constant across CEOs, and thus 
independent of size does not work in practice.  
This means that millions and billions of dollars 
(pounds, euros) might be lost every single period, 
which actually demands for very strong governing 
policies.  
Hansell et al. ([10], p. 28) found that for 158 large US 
companies the CEO remuneration and companies’ 
performance were moving in different directions for 
2007 till - 2008 which is in line with a press rumours 
about excessive executive pay during the economic 
downturn.  
The important factor influencing directors’ remunera-
tion as well as company performance is company size. 
A study by Rosen (1982:311-323) indicates that small 
difference in the quality of CEO can make a big differ-
ence in larger firms, so, larger firms try to attract the 
best directors for their firms. This results in higher 
remuneration packages in larger companies as to ac-
quire the best CEO for the firm and to keep him or her 
interested in the firm. 
Studies of many scholars reflect the influence of per-
formance on director’s remuneration. When the firm 
perform well in the market, CEOs are rewarded with 
compensation package. Lewellen et al. ([19], pp. 710-
720) have shown that CEO remuneration is strongly 
influence by generating profit. Gregg et al. ([8],  
pp. 1-9) examined UK listed 288 large firms over  
the period 1983-1991. They found the evidence that 
directors pay is related strongly with firm size. They 
confirmed that 50% increase in a firms revenue resulted 
in 10% increase in directors remuneration. Baker et al. 
([1], pp. 593-616) studied the relation between manag-
ing directors’ payment scheme and revenue. They 
found positive relation between CEO compensation  
and firm size. Firm that grow 10 % in size usually pay 
3 %more to its CEOs. 
Kostiuk ([18], pp. 90-105) has determined approxi-
mately the same result when he examined 73 large firm 
of U.S over the time 1968 to 1981. Zhou ([27], pp. 213-
251) examined on 755 firms which are all Canadian 
firms and his works also found that CEO pay is posi-
tively correlated with firm size. The same tendency has 
been confirmed within Japanese companies by studies 
of Zhou et al. ([28], pp. 665-696) and Kato ([16],  
pp. 93-510). 
Baker et al. ([1], pp. 593-616) establish smaller pay 
performance sensitivity on CEO compensation in large 
firms. Their work also show that insignificant CEO 
owns amount of firm’s stock’s of larger firms, which 
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are usually more than CEO’s of small firms. This is 
why pay performance sensitivity is less significant  
in small firms but more significant in larger firms. They 
also highlight, that motivation strength of CEO’s can 
be linked with the number of stock owned by CEO’s. 
This has been established based on minor efficiency  
of CEO’s effort rising in accordance with firm size. 
The recent study of Kato et al. ([15], pp. 1-19)  
on Japanese firms’ performance shows the influence  
of firm performance to CEO remuneration scheme. 
Their works show especially strong impact of account-
ing measures on directors pay but less impact of stock 
market performance. 
Lewellen et al. ([19], pp. 710-720) examined whether 
any positive relation can be found between CEO com-
pensation and firm performance. Their research on 50 
US firms over the period from 1942 to 1963 shows that 
generating profit is strongly depends on CEO compen-
sation. 
Rosen ([22], pp. 311-323) established that the influence 
of ROE on CEO compensation in 0,1 – 0,15 range  
and the elasticity of CEO pay and firm size are not 
significantly different from beta of 0,3. 
Gregg et al. ([8], pp. 1-9) in their study of large UK 
firms found that, in terms of share returns over  
the whole fiscal year, the influence of CEO pay  
on firm performance is very weak. When they exam-
ined the relation between CEO pay and firm perfor-
mance again after slitting the data into 2 time period 
which were 1983 – 1988 and 1989 – 1991, they found 
that CEO pay is positively related to firm performance 
for the first period of time.  
Finkelstein at al. ([6], pp. 179-199) looked at 1000 
Fortune firms and found that CEO compensation is 
positively related with ROE (Return On Equity), firm 
size and managerial discretion such as R & D intensity, 
market growth. 
 
4 Research methodology 
 
This research concentrates on investigating whether 
CEO remuneration is positively related to companies’ 
size, accounting performance and to market perfor-
mance. The investigation try to addresser the following 
questions:  
• Does relation between firm size and directors’ re-
muneration exist in selected sample – this part  
of the research follows the approach of Oetomo  
et al. [20], who examined directors’ remuneration  
in relation to companies’ size. They used book val-
ue of total assets as a proxy for firm size. Rosser et 
al. ([23], pp. 115-126) also used book value of total 
assets as firm size when they investigated  
the impact of firm size on CEO compensation. Fol-
lowing regression model is used to determine the re-
lationship between CEO compensation on firm size:  
 CEO remuneration =  
 a + b { firm size ( total assets ) } + e (2) 
• Does company performance impact directors remu-
neration - to answer this question Shim et al. ([25], 
pp. 93-116) path will be followed. They used return 
on equity (ROE) as a proxy for accounting perfor-
mance indicator and Tobin’s Q as a performance 
measurement for market factor to determine the im-
pact of company performance on directors pay.  
To determine the relationship between CEO com-
pensation on accounting factor: following regres-
sion model is used: 
 CEO compensation  =  
 a + b {accounting factor ( ROE )} + e  (3) 
- ROE is calculated by dividing Net income after 
tax with total equity, 
- net income is selected after tax and preferred 
stock dividends but before common stock divi-
dends, 
- preferred shares are excluded from total equity.  
To determine the relationship between CEO compensa-
tion on market factor following regression model is 
used:  
 CEO compensation  =  
 a + b{ market factor (Tobin’s Q)} +e  (4) 
Here market value equals to: 
 Tobin’s Q  =  [MVE + DEBT + PS] / TA (5) 
where: 
MVE  - is the market value of shareholders equity,  
DEBT - is the value of the firm’s short – term liabilities 
net its short term assets plus the book value  
of the firms long term debt,  
PS - is the liquidating value of the firm’s outstanding 
preferred stock, 
TA - is the book value of the total assets of the firm. 
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Figure 1. FTSE 100 sample  
(source: own work) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. WSE sample structure  
(source: own work)
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In all three models compensation (remuneration) is 
consider as dependant variable. Compensation is the 
total of cash pay and share own by CEO (director). 
 
5 Data collection and findings 
 
At first 130 from companies has been considered  
for this study, but the final sample contains only 110 
listed companies as some of the companies have not 
disclosed necessary information over investigated peri-
od. 80 companies have been randomly chosen from 
FTSE 100. The companies have been investigated  
for the period two periods: 2007-2008 and 2009-2010. 
The structure of the sample is presented in Fig. 1. 
50 companies have been randomly selected from firms 
listed on Warsaw Stock Exchange. Only 30 were con-
sidered for the analysis as only those companies pro-
vide information about directors’ remuneration.  
The structure of the sample is presented in Fig. 2. De-
scriptive statistics for each variable has been calculated 
for the purpose of data analysis. To point out the inter 
correlation among various measures Pearson’s Correla-
tion has been used. To verify the significance  
of the relation between CEO compensation and various 
measures, linear regression has been used. Regression 
models have been applied to identify relations between 
CEO compensation and selected factors. 
Within investigated UK listed companies, the minimum 
full compensation was £900,000 as the highest £8,9m. 
At the same, the same time the average basic salary  
of CEO reached £981,000. Within Polish listed compa-
nies the minimum full compensation was PLN 2,8m  
as the highest PLN 9,88m. At the same time the aver-
age basic salary of CEO reached PLN 865,000.  
The data has been obtained through content analysis  
of annual reports of selected companies. 
Table 1, Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4 present correla-
tion matrix between director’s compensation, firm size 
(total assets), accounting factor (ROE) and market 
factor (Tobin’s Q). 
The research shows (see Table 1) that CEO compensa-
tion of UK based companies between 2007 and 2008 is 
positively related with accounting factor (0,020) and 
market factor (0,035), but negatively related with  
and firm size (-0,15). Similar results have been ob-
tained for 2009-2010. It shows that CEO remuneration 
is positively related with accounting factor (0,022)  
and market factor (0,035) though the relation with mar-
ket factor is slightly lower than in previous years. 
 
 
Table 1. Correlation matrix British companies for 2007-2008  
(source: own work) 
Factor Statistic Remuneration (total pay) 
Firm size 
(total assets) 
Accounting 
Factor (ROE) 
Market factor 
(Tobin’s Q) 
Remuneration 
(total pay) 
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
1 
- 
80 
-0,015 
0,823 
80 
0,020 
0,783 
80 
0,035 
0,628 
80 
Firm size 
(total assets) 
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
-0,015 
0,823 
80 
1 
- 
80 
-0,024 
0,793 
80 
-0,215* 
0,003 
80 
Accounting Factor 
(ROE) 
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
0,020 
0,783 
80 
-0,024 
0,793 
80 
1 
- 
80 
-0,038 
0,598 
80 
Market factor 
(Tobin’s Q) 
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
0,035 
0,628 
80 
-0,215* 
0,003 
80 
-0,038 
0,598 
80 
1 
- 
80 
*correlation is significant at the 0,01 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 2. Correlation matrix British companies for 2009-2010  
(source: own work) 
Factor Statistic Remuneration (total pay) 
Firm size 
(total assets) 
Accounting 
Factor 
(ROE) 
Market factor 
(Tobin’s Q) 
Remuneration 
(total pay) 
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
1 
- 
80 
-0,023 
0,892 
80 
0,022 
0,754 
80 
0,045 
0,666 
80 
Firm size 
(total assets) 
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
-0,023 
0,892 
80 
1 
- 
80 
-0,032 
0,777 
80 
-0,240* 
0,003 
80 
Accounting Factor 
(ROE) 
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
0,022 
0,754 
80 
-0,032 
0,777 
80 
1 
- 
80 
-0,040 
0,578 
80 
Market factor 
(Tobin’s Q) 
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
0,045 
0,666 
80 
-0,240* 
0,003 
80 
-0,040 
0,578 
80 
1 
- 
80 
*correlation is significant at the 0,01 level (2-tailed) 
In 2009-2010 negative relation between CEO compen-
sation and firm size (-0,23) has been observe, which  
is in line with previous year’s results. The impact  
is stronger in comparison to the first set of research  
and it is mainly due to the recession over the investi-
gated period. Over the period of 2007-2008 the nega-
tive relation has been establish between company size 
and accounting factor (-0,024) and company size versus 
market factor (-0,215). Similar relation has been notice 
over the 2009-2010 period although the relation  
is slightly stronger (company size vs. accounting factor 
(-0,032), company size vs. market factor (-0,240).  
In both periods accounting factor (ROE) is negatively 
related with market factor (Tobin’s Q) (2007-2008:  
-0,038; 2009-2010: -0,040). 
Table 3 and 4 presents regression of CEO compensa-
tion on firm size. The results indicate that there  
is positive correlation between directors’ compensation 
and company size. The increase of total assets by 1 % 
over the period of 2007-2008 results in 8% increase  
of directors’ remuneration and by 11% over 2009-2010. 
It is rather surprising that in the second period the cor-
relation is so strong over the economy downturn (2009-
2010). T–test value of the regression coefficient  
of the constant is 2,213 in the first period and 3,333  
in the second period. This is significant and the t–test 
value of the regression coefficient of the independent 
variable, which is firm size (total assets), in this case,  
is 0,212 and 0,343 respectively. 
Table 3. Regression on directors’ compensation and firm size UK listed companies for 2007-2008  
(source: own work) 
Model Unstandardised Coefficient 
Standardised 
Coefficient t Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta 
1 constant 
Firm Size (total assets) 
294,933 
,000 
133,267 
,001 
- 
,080 
2,213 
,212 
,028 
,823 
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Table 4. Regression on directors’ compensation and firm size UK listed companies for 2009-2010  
(source: own work) 
Model Unstandardised Coefficient 
Standardised 
Coefficient t Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta 
1 constant 
Firm Size (total assets) 
256,988 
,000 
122,277 
,01 
- 
,11 
3,333 
,343 
,023 
,799 
 
 
Table 5. Correlation matrix Polish companies for 2007-2008 
 (source: own work) 
Factor Statistic Remuneration (total pay) 
Firm size 
(total assets) 
Accounting 
Factor (ROE) 
Market factor 
(Tobin’s Q) 
Remuneration 
(total pay) 
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
1 
- 
30 
-0,022 
0,833 
30 
0,027 
0,773 
30 
0,028 
0,688 
30 
Firm size 
(total assets) 
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
-0,022 
0,833 
30 
1 
- 
30 
-0,028 
0,693 
30 
-0,225* 
0,007 
30 
Accounting 
Factor 
(ROE) 
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
0,027 
0,773 
30 
-0,028 
0,693 
30 
1 
- 
30 
-0,033 
0,558 
30 
Market factor 
(Tobin’s Q) 
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
0,028 
0,688 
30 
-0,225* 
0,007 
30 
-0,033 
0,558 
30 
1 
- 
30 
*correlation is significant at the 0,01 level (2-tailed) 
 
Table 6. Correlation matrix Polish companies for 2009-2010 
 (source: own work) 
Factor Statistic Remuneration (total pay) 
Firm size 
(total assets) 
Accounting 
Factor (ROE) 
Market factor 
(Tobin’s Q) 
Remuneration 
(total pay) 
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
1 
- 
30 
-0,020 
0,822 
30 
0,022 
0,783 
30 
0,025 
0,718 
30 
Firm size 
(total assets) 
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
-0,020 
0,822 
30 
1 
- 
30 
-0,022 
0,683 
30 
-0,220* 
0,004 
30 
Accounting Factor 
(ROE) 
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
0,022 
0,783 
30 
-0,022 
0,683 
30 
1 
- 
30 
-0,031 
0,598 
30 
Market factor 
(Tobin’s Q) 
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
0,025 
0,718 
30 
-0,220* 
0,004 
30 
-0,031 
0,588 
30 
1 
- 
30 
*correlation is significant at the 0,01 level (2-tailed)  
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When examining the relation between CEO compensa-
tion between 2007 and 2008 of Polish listed companies 
(see Table 5) a positive relation with accounting factor 
(0,027) and market factor (0,028) can be seen but nega-
tive relation with firm size (-0,22). Similar results have 
been obtained for 2009-2010. It shows that Polish CEO 
remuneration is positively related with accounting fac-
tor (0,022) and market factor (0,025) though both rela-
tions are lower than in previous years.  
In 2009-2010 negative relation between CEO compen-
sation and firm size (-0,20) has been observe, which is 
in line with previous years. Over the period of 2007-
2008 the negative relation has been establish between 
company size and accounting factor (-0,028) and com-
pany size versus market factor (-0,225).  
Similar relation has been notice over the 2009-2010 
period although the relation is slightly stronger (com-
pany size vs. accounting factor (-0,022), company size 
vs. market factor (-0,220). In both periods, accounting 
factor (ROE) is negatively related with market factor 
(Tobin’s Q) (2007-2008: -0,033; 2009-2010: -0,031).  
The regression of CEO compensation on firm size (see 
Table 7 and Table 8) shows positive correlation  
of 1,5% between directors’ compensation and company 
size over the period of 2007-2008 and 4% positive 
correlation over 2009-2010. 
T-test value of the regression coefficient of the constant 
is 2,111 in the first period and 2,233 in the second peri-
od. This is significant and the t–test value of the regres-
sion coefficient of the independent variable, which is 
firm size (total assets), in this case, is 0,213 and 0,233 
respectively. 
The results obtain within Polish companies are very 
similar to those noted when investigating British firms 
and are in line with outcomes of studies  
of Jansen et al. ([14], pp. 255-268), Baker et al. ([1], 
pp. 593-616) or Rosen ([22], pp. 311-323). In earlier 
studies, many scholars proved that CEO compensation 
is positively related with firm size. However, there is 
no clear indication about why firm size is correlated 
positively with CEO compensation. Jensen et al. ([14], 
pp. 593-616) assumed that maybe larger firms tend to 
give higher remuneration regardless of CEO abilities. 
Rosen ([22], pp. 311-323) has brought up similar con-
clusion. Baker et al. ([1], pp. 593-616) stress that usual-
ly there is greater pay performance sensitivity in larger 
firms and lesser significance of pay performance sensi-
tivity in smaller firms. This allows to conclude there is 
that directors’ compensation is positively related with 
firm size. Although it should be noted that further stud-
ies should be conducted to look for more factors under-
pinning this trend. 
 
Table 7. Regression on directors’ compensation and firm size Polish listed companies for 2007-2008  
(source: own work) 
Model Unstandardised Coefficient Standardised Coefficient  
t 
 
Sig.  B Std. Error Beta 
1 constant 
Firm Size (total assets) 
222,113 
,000 
122,227 
,001 
- 
,015 
2,113 
,250 
,030 
,823 
 
 
Table 8. Regression on directors’ compensation and firm size Polish listed companies for 2009-2010  
(source: own work) 
Model Unstandardised Coefficient Standardised Coefficient t Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta 
1 constant 
Firm Size (total assets) 
236,111 
,000 
111,707 
,01 
- 
,040 
2,233 
,233 
,023 
,722 
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There is positive a correlation between directors pay 
and accounting factor within British companies (Table 
9 and Table 10). The research indicate that 1% increase 
in return on equity (accounting factor) over the period 
of 2007-2008 increase directors compensation  
by 2%.and by 3% over the period of 2009-2010. T-test 
value of the regression coefficient of the constant is 
2,254 and 2,355 respectively, which is significant.  
The t–test value of the regression coefficient of the 
independent variable (accounting factor/return on equi-
ty) is 0,275 and 0,255 respectively. 
 
Table 9. Regression on director’s compensation and accounting factor within UK listed companies for 2007-2008  
(source: own work) 
Model Unstandardised Coefficient 
Standardised 
Coefficient t Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta 
1 constant 
Accounting Factor (ROE) 
284,916 
34,447 
126,431 
125,193 
- 
,020 
2,254 
,275 
,025 
,783 
Table 10. Regression on director’s compensation and accounting factor within UK listed companies for 2009-2010 
(source: own work) 
Model Unstandardised Coefficient Standardised Coefficient t Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta 
1 constant 
Accounting Factor (ROE) 
277,116 
24,117 
132,331 
121,281 
 
,03 
2,355 
,255 
,022 
,753 
Table 11. Regression on director’s compensation and accounting factor within Polish listed companies 2007-2008 
 (source: own work) 
Model Unstandardised Coefficient Standardised Coefficient t Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta 
1 constant 
Accounting Factor (ROE) 
254,916 
14,447 
133,431 
123,182 
 
,010 
2,154 
,225 
,029 
,755 
Table 12. Regression on director’s compensation and accounting factor within Polish listed companies 2009-2010  
(source: own work) 
Model Unstandardised Coefficient 
Standardised 
Coefficient t Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta 
1 constant 
Accounting Factor (ROE) 
263,618 
15,336 
123,233 
133,812 
- 
,015 
2,554 
,233 
,026 
,761 
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The results of Polish firms show similar results (see 
Table 11 and Table 12). Positive relation has been es-
tablished between directors pay and accounting factor. 
Each increase in accounting factor by 1% impacted 
directors’ compensation with the increase of 1% over 
the 2007-2008 and 1,5% over 2009-2010. T-test value 
of the regression coefficient of the constant is 2,154 
and 2,554, which is significant and the t-test value  
of the regression coefficient is 0,225 and 0,233 respec-
tively.  
The results within both countries are in line with out-
comes obtained by Shim et al. ([25], pp. 93-116) within 
high–tech and low–tech firm over the period of 1999-
2001. 
When looking at the links between directors’ compen-
sation and market factor it can be noted that a positive 
correlation exists between Tobin’s Q and directors’ 
remuneration within UK companies (Table 13 and 
Table 14).  
Table 13. Regression on director’s compensation and market factor within UK listed companies 2007-2008 
 (source: own work) 
Model Unstandardised Coefficient 
Standardised 
Coefficient t Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta 
1 constant 
Market Factor (Tobin`s Q) 
157,484 
223,626 
292,984 
460,142 
- 
0,040 
,538 
,468 
,592 
,628 
Table 14. Regression on director’s compensation and market factor within UK listed companies 2009-2010 
 (source: own work) 
Model Unstandardised Coefficient Standardised Coefficient t Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta 
1 constant 
Market Factor (Tobin`s Q) 
155,484 
244,262 
272,777 
433,111 
- 
0,040 
,558 
,466 
,583 
,658 
Table 15. Regression on director’s compensation and market factor within Polish listed companies 2007-2008 
 (source: own work) 
Model 
Unstandardised  
Coefficient 
Standardised 
Coefficient  
t 
 
Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta 
1 constant 
Makter Factor (Tobin`s Q) 
144,444 
209,222 
272,977 
401,421 
- 
0,020 
,511 
,488 
,555 
,633 
Table 16. Regression on director’s compensation and market factor within Polish listed companies 2009-2010 
 (source: own work) 
Model 
Unstandardised  
Coefficient 
Standardised 
Coefficient  
t 
 
Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta 
1 constant 
Makter Factor (Tobin`s Q) 
1614,321 
222,343 
267,121 
422,333 
- 
0,025 
,577 
,488 
,572 
,599 
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The increase of Tobin’s Q by 1% increased director 
pay by 4% in 2007-2008 and stay at the same level for 
2009-2010. T-test value of the regression coefficient of 
the constant is 0,538 and 0,558 respectively and is sig-
nificant. The t-test of the regression coefficient of the 
independent variable which is market factor (Tobin’s 
Q) in this case, is 0,48 and 0,466 respectively. 
For Polish companies the situation demonstrates  
the same trend. The increase of Tobin’s Q by 1% boost 
director pay by 2% in 2007-2008 and 2,5% 2009-2010. 
T-test value of the regression coefficient of the constant 
is 0,511 and 0,577 respectively, which is significant. 
The t-test value of the regression coefficient of the 
independent variable, which is market factor (Tobin’s 
Q), in this case, is 0,488 and 0,511(see Table 15 and 
Table 16). 
The achieved results from Polish and British sample are 
consistent with findings of Kato et al. ([15], pp. 1-19) 
research on Japanese firms or Randøy et al. ([21], pp. 
57-81) on Norwegian and Swedish firms. All this stud-
ies conclude positive that CEO compensation is posi-
tively related with market performance. 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
Looking at the area of directors’ compensation the 
question is always raised how remuneration is related 
to directors’ impute. How remuneration package needs 
to be structure to maximise shareholders wealth.  
In most cases CEO payment are correlated with com-
panies’ performance and size. This research established 
positive correlation between directors’ payment  
and companies’ size (book asset value) in both British 
and Polish listed companies. Furthermore, positive 
correlation has been found between firms return  
on capital and directors remuneration in both samples. 
Directors’ compensation is also positively associated 
with market performance for both British and Polish 
firm. All three factors are much stronger correlated 
with directors remuneration within British companies. 
This can be associated with more developed economy, 
different structure of directors’ remuneration, or British 
directors having stronger position when negotiating 
payment packages. All findings are consistent with the 
results obtained by scholars conducting research in this 
field. 
British companies are obliged to disclose information 
about director’s remuneration. It is strongly regarded as 
an element of enhancing the transparency of corporate 
governance. It was disappointing that many Polish 
listed companies do not publish information about di-
rectors’ remuneration. This force researcher to limit  
the study to thirty companies only. It is hoped that  
in the future Polish companies disclose more infor-
mation about directors’ remuneration and it would be 
possible to conduct wider analysis in this field.  
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